Holding elections has become a global norm. Unfortunately, the integrity of elections varies strongly, ranging from "free and fair" elections with genuine contestation to "façade" elections marred by manipulation and fraud. Clearly, electoral integrity is a topic of increasing concern. Yet electoral integrity is notoriously difficult to measure, and hence taking stock of the available data is important. This article compares cross-national data sets measuring electoral integrity. The first part evaluates how the different data sets (a) conceptualize electoral integrity, (b) move from concepts to indicators, and (c) move from indicators to data. The second part analyses how different data sets code the same elections, seeking to explain the sources of disagreement about electoral integrity. The sample analysed comprises 746 elections in 95 third and fourth wave regimes from 1974 until 2009. I find that conceptual and measurement choices affect disagreement about election integrity, and also find that elections of lower integrity and post-conflict elections generate higher disagreement about election integrity. The article concludes with a discussion of results and suggestions for future research.
Introduction
In the wake of the third wave of regime transitions and the subsequent democratizations following the end of the Cold War, elections spread to Latin America, Eastern Europe, former Soviet republics, sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia. 1 With the recent Arab Spring, over 90% of the world's states now select their national leaders through elections. 2 However, the integrity of these elections varies widely: ranging from "free and fair" elections with genuine contestation to "façade" elections marred by manipulation and fraud. While global norms for elections increasingly converged, 3 global practice shows a widely varying "menu of manipulation". 4 Clearly, research on electoral integrity is increasingly relevant, and important advancements in conceptualizing and measuring electoral integrity have been made. 5 However, due to the covert nature of fraud and the complexity of electoral processes, electoral integrity is very difficult to measure. Hence evaluating the validity and reliability of existing data is important. This article takes stock of the available cross-national data sets and compares 11 data sets measuring electoral integrity in various regions of the world. 6 The article is set up as follows. The first section describes and evaluates how the different data sets (a) conceptualize electoral integrity, (b) move from concepts to indicators, and (c) move from indicators to data. 7 The following section analyses how different data sets code the same elections, seeking to explain the sources of disagreement between different data sets. The article concludes with a discussion of results and suggestions for future data collection on electoral integrity.
Evaluating data sets on electoral integrity: conceptualization and measurement
This section discusses how different data sets conceptualize and measure electoral integrity. Following the three phases identified by Adcock and Collier, the first part of this section describes how the different data sets conceptualize electoral integrity, the following part discusses operationalization (from concepts to indicators), and the last part evaluates the data collection process (from indicators to data). The evaluation is based on two standards of assessment: validity and reliability. Validity is defined as whether the measurements used actually capture the phenomenon of interest, that is, whether the three phases of conceptualization, operationalization, and data collection result in data that "measure what they are supposed to measure". 8 Reliability is defined as the extent to which the data collection process produces the same results on repeated trials (and hence only applies to the last phase).
9 Table 1 provides an overview of the standards of assessment.
In Section 2.1 on conceptualization, the core question is what criteria authors use to conceptualize electoral integrity: are these criteria that are explicit, can be validly measured, and are cross-nationally comparable? Here key challenges to validity are that some criteria cannot be validly measured and that criteria are not always made explicit. Section 2.2 subsequently evaluates whether concepts of electoral integrity are operationalized in terms of more specific conceptual attributes, as this enables measurement of electoral integrity using multiple and clearly specified indicators. Here, the key challenge to validity is that several data sets skip this step, and use a broad definition of electoral integrity that is measured with a single overall indicator. 10 Finally, Section 2.3 evaluates data collection, discussing the selection of sources, measurement level, and coding. Here, the key challenge to validity is the sources used to gather data on electoral integrity, which may bias measurements in various ways. 
Conceptualizing electoral integrity
What does it mean to "get elections right"? 11 In recent years, various conceptualizations emerged, as Table 2 shows. 12 These conceptualizations differ in three aspects: first, whether election integrity is defined positively or negatively, second, whether election integrity is defined using particular or universal criteria, and finally, whether election integrity is defined using a process or concept-based approach. 13 First, conceptualizations differ in defining election integrity positively, by specifying the presence of criteria (or fulfilment of norms) for democratic elections, or negatively, by identifying the absence of criteria (or norm-violations) that render elections less-than-democratic or plainly un-democratic.
14 Positive definitions use terms ranging from free and fair elections, clean elections, and democratic elections to election quality and electoral integrity. 15 Conversely, negative definitions refer to flawed elections, electoral malpractice or misconduct, electoral manipulation, fraud, or corruption, and election rigging. 16 An example of a positive definition is Munck's conceptualization of democratic elections: Munck provides both a conceptualization of "electoral democracy" and "democratic elections". The conceptualization of "democratic elections" is more extensive and is therefore mentioned here. However, data are not available for "democratic elections", so the data used for this article are the Electoral Democracy Index item on "clean elections". First, elections must be inclusive, [ . . . ] that is, all citizens must be effectively enabled to exercise their right to vote in the electoral process; second; elections must be clean, in other words, voters' preferences must be respected and faithfully registered; third; elections must be competitive, that is, they must offer the electorate an unbiased choice among alternatives; and fourth; the main public offices must be accessed through periodic elections, and the results expressed through the citizens' votes must not be reversed.
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Examples of negative definitions are Birch's definition of electoral malpractice as "the manipulation of electoral processes and outcomes so as to substitute personal or partisan benefit for the public interest", López-Pintor's notion of electoral fraud as "any purposeful action taken to tamper with electoral activities and electionrelated materials in order to affect the results of an election, which may interfere with or thwart the will of the voters", and Lehoucq's conception of electoral fraud as "clandestine efforts to shape election results".
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Note that both positive and negative conceptualizations identify norms that should be met for elections to have high integrity, or conversely, norms that should be violated for elections to have low integrity. However, while positive definitions focus on defining these norms, negative definitions emphasize actors, intentionality, and -sometimes -the consequences for election outcomes. For example, Birch's and Schedler's term "manipulation" implies actor(s) involved in manipulating, as does López-Pintor's "purposeful action". 19 The latter also stresses intentionality, that is, actions have to be purposeful, with the aim to "shape the election results". 20 Hence, negative definitions emphasize that "malpractice" or "fraud" should be delimited to those acts that are intentionally perpetuated with the aim to change the election results. Irregularities that result from administrative incapacity are not to be considered as "malpractice" or "fraud". However, this poses both conceptual and measurement problems, as first, it may be quite difficult to distinguish intentional actions from organizational incapacity, and second, non-intentional irregularities (such as inaccurate voter registration) can have significant consequences for election integrity. Hence, even if measurement could reliably distinguish between intentional and nonintentional irregularities, the question is whether the latter should be excluded from the conceptualization of electoral integrity. In addition to intentionality, some negative conceptualizations also consider whether irregularities affected election outcomes. However, in terms of measurement validity this seems problematic too, as the only way to gauge voters' preferences is through the electoral process and if the latter was flawed, observers have little possibility to know what voters' preferences were.
Hence, measurements of election integrity that are purely based on how frequently irregularities occurred might generate more valid data. This implies that positive conceptualizations may be preferable to negative conceptualizations, not because such conceptualizations are inherently better, but because they enable a broader conceptualization of election integrity that includes both intentional and unintentional irregularities, and because the focus on the frequency of 718 C. van Ham irregularities (and not actors, intentions, or outcomes) may generate more valid measurement. A second aspect differentiating conceptualizations is whether they use universal or particular criteria to assess electoral integrity. 21 While universal approaches define the integrity of elections with reference to a universal democratic standard, often based on democratic theory and/or international law, particular approaches define the integrity of elections with reference to the citizens and parties involved. An example of the latter is Pastor's definition of a flawed election as "an election in which some or all of the major political parties refuse to participate in the election or reject the results" or Elklit and Reynolds's assertion that: "The quality of an election can [ . . . ] be conceptualized as the degree to which political actors at all levels and from different political strands see the electoral process as legitimate and binding." 22 The argument in favour of a particular approach is that elections are different in different contexts, and even if the elections do not meet ideal democratic standards, it is ultimately up to domestic stakeholders to judge elections to be acceptable or not. This approach seems especially useful for research using electoral integrity as the independent variable, for example research seeking to explain post-election events like protests or conflict. In this case, arguably citizen and elite perceptions of the integrity of the electoral process are of interest, regardless of whether these match the actual irregularities that occurred. However, for research that is comparative and focuses on electoral integrity as the dependent variable, using the same assessment criteria for all elections is important, and hence a universal approach seems more appropriate in this case.
A third important choice in the conceptualization of election integrity is whether to take a process-based or concept-based approach, or a combination of both. 23 While concept-based approaches define the integrity of elections based on ideal democratic standards (as discussed above), process-based conceptualizations consider the electoral process before, during, and after election day. Examples of process-based conceptualizations are the frameworks for election quality proposed by Elklit and Reynolds and electoral governance by Mozaffar and Schedler. 24 The advantage of process-based conceptualizations is that they allow for precise measurement of election integrity. Elections are complex logistical operations, hence ordering the electoral process by the sequential steps taken before, during, and after election day, helps to ensure that all relevant aspects are taken into account. However, this approach runs the risk of generating vast "checklists" of indicators by which to judge elections, posing both practical difficulties in terms of data collection as well as questions about how to evaluate the relative importance of irregularities. 25 Also, while process-based approaches draw on ideal democratic standards to identify irregularities, these criteria remain rather implicit in the evaluation of each step of the electoral process.
Some scholars combine process-and concept-based approaches. For example, Elklit and Svensson propose a definition of "free and fair" elections based on democratic theory and then proceed to develop a set of indicators that measures "free-and fair-ness" before, during, and after elections. 26 Other examples are Schmeets who relates the seven Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 1990 Copenhagen principles for democratic elections to irregularities in the voting and counting process, Schedler traces the process of electoral choice from the ex-ante formation of preferences and availability of choice to the consequences of choice, and identifies possible strategies of manipulation at each step, and Davis-Roberts and Carroll identify international law principles relating to elections and link them to the different stages of the electoral process. 27 The advantage of using a combination is that the benchmark against which elections are evaluated is explicit (the advantage of concept-based approaches), while making sure the entire electoral process is taken into consideration (the advantage of process-based approaches).
Concluding, in terms of conceptualization, three choices appear to be consequential for data on election integrity. Regarding positive or negative concepts, positive conceptualizations may enable more valid measurement of election integrity because they focus on the frequency of irregularities and not on actor intentionality or the consequences of irregularities for the election outcome. Regarding universal or particular criteria, if the interest of the researcher is to explain crosscountry and over-time variation in electoral integrity, using universal criteria that allow for cross-national comparison seems preferable. Finally, a combination of concept-and process-based approaches may be preferable since it explicitly specifies the criteria of evaluation while ensuring that the scope of the entire electoral process is taken into account, improving both validity and reliability of measurement.
Operationalizing electoral integrity: from concepts to indicators
When moving from concept to indicators, the core questions are which and how many indicators to use, and whether those indicators adequately capture the concept one wants to measure. While the previous section evaluated a broader set of authors, in this section I discuss only a selection of authors that collected empirical data on electoral integrity. This results in 11 data sets.
28 Table 3 provides an overview.
Ideally one would like to break up the concept of election integrity into multiple indicators and measure each of these indicators separately, reducing measurement error. However, as Table 3 demonstrates, six out of 11 data sets measure election integrity using a single overall indicator. This is problematic because with a single-indicator measure of election integrity it is not clear which aspects of the electoral process are taken into account. In practice, overall judgements are probably based on a variety of indicators that are considered by coders but not coded explicitly, that is, the aggregation of data is done in the coder's mind. If different authors have different indicators in mind and/or assign different weights to indicators, this could lead to different overall scores of election integrity. For example, if one author considers election violence to be more serious than another, this will lead to systematic biases in overall scores of election integrity.
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C. van Ham Note that Donno includes three variables on electoral misconduct, one based on election observation reports only and two based on multiple sources. Since the latter are both partly based on NELDA data, they are not included in the analyses. 59 In addition, single indicator measures do not allow researchers to evaluate whether all relevant indicators are included. For example, Anglin shows that measures of election integrity tend to be focused on election day, neglecting irregularities in the period before the elections.
29 If the increased frequency and effectiveness of election monitoring has led "efforts by entrenched leaders to manipulate electoral processes [ . . . ] to become more subtle", shifting irregularities to the period before the elections, data that do not take into account the pre-election environment might seriously underestimate the extent of irregularities.
30 Moreover, single-indicator measures of electoral integrity are also problematic if there is a trade-off between different types of irregularities. If specific irregularities are positively correlated, measuring election integrity with a smaller set of indicators or even a single indicator might increase measurement error, but will nevertheless still tap part of the concept of interest. If, however, certain irregularities are negatively correlated (as when there is a trade-off between irregularities before and during election day), separate indicators are needed for pre-election and election day irregularities in order to measure the concept accurately.
Using multiple indicators to measure election integrity is hence preferable to decrease measurement error and more accurately measure irregularities in various parts of the electoral process. However, this requires a higher investment of resources in data gathering (and data sources that provide precise enough information). Examples of multi-indicator approaches are the data gathered by Anglin, Birch, Kelley and Kiril, Hyde and Marinov, and Simpser. 31 2.3 Collecting data on electoral integrity: from indicators to data This section evaluates the data collection process. Here, the core questions are (a) the sources on which data are based, (b) the level of measurement, and (c) the procedures used to gather data.
For data collection, the most important factor determining data quality are the sources of information used. Sources vary from election observation reports to news media, historical sources, complaints filed by political parties, surveys, ethnographic research, and evaluations by country experts.
32 Distinctions can be made between "partisan" and "non-partisan" sources, or between "subjective" and "objective" sources. 33 Lehoucq defines complaints filed by political parties or newspaper accounts as partisan sources, while considering assessments of election irregularities by citizens or country experts as non-partisan. 34 Hartlyn and McCoy distinguish between subjective sources, that is, actors that participate in the electoral process like citizens and parties, and objective sources, that is, observers of the electoral process like news media, country experts, and election observers. 35 However, whether considered partisan or subjective, all these sources are likely to have some degree of bias. Newspapers may have different ideological orientations and links to political parties, and hence data based on newspaper accounts should take this into account. Citizens have a stake in elections depending on their political orientation, and hence surveys and ethnographic research should In addition to partisanship or subjectivity, other sources of bias may be incomplete geographical or temporal coverage. For example, citizens are only able to report on irregularities that occurred in their surroundings, requiring good geographical coverage of surveys. Likewise, news media might only have limited access in certain parts of the country and election observation missions cannot be physically present in each and every polling station (and in fact often only cover a fraction of polling stations).
36 Though less obvious perhaps, temporal coverage of sources is also a problem. For example, coding elections that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s makes reliance on election observation mission reports less viable since missions were not that common at the time, and collecting good information on electoral conduct based on news resources in that period may be more challenging as well.
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As international election observation missions have become so common since the 1990s, election observation reports constitute the source most commonly used in data sets on electoral integrity (seven out of 11 data sets). Moreover, often news media reports and academic sources build on international observer assessments in their own analyses of elections. Hence, examining potential biases of this source in more detail is important. Considering partisan bias, missions from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) with less democratic member states tend to be more lenient in their assessments than IGOs with more democratic member states and NGOs. This is why most researchers use data from missions that apply stricter norms in their election assessments such as the OSCE, the EU, the OAS and the Carter Centre, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), or the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). 38 Certain types of elections are also judged differently. As such, international election observers seem to be less critical in "founding elections, elections that lead to alternation in power or establish peace after civil wars", and in elections that demonstrate an improvement compared to previous elections. 39 This suggests that "the overall assessment of the election may in some cases be less informative than the sub-components whose evaluation is typically embedded in the reports' details", that are less prone to such bias. 40 An easy solution for measuring electoral integrity in an accurate, non-partisan way is unlikely to exist. However, a possibility for reducing source bias in measurement would be to use multiple data sources. This might be a good way of "balancing" sources so as to limit partisan bias and increase temporal and geographic coverage, and this is indeed the strategy followed by Anglin, Van de Walle, Lindberg, Hyde and Marinov, Donno, Schedler, and Simpser. 41 Regarding measurement level, Table 3 shows that scales vary from dichotomous distinctions between flawed and non-flawed elections to more fine-grained 724 C. van Ham distinctions of three -five ordinal categories. These may seem quite coarse measurement levels, however, as Munck and Verkuilen emphasize, fine-grained distinctions are only preferable if the sources on which scores are based provide sufficient information to make these distinctions. 42 Given the oft-limited coverage of the sources used to score elections, using ordinal scales that vary between three and five categories seems quite reasonable. When multiple indicators are measured, the scales used are often ordinal scales with four -five categories that range from low to high presence of irregularities. For example, Birch codes indicators on a five-point scale ranging from "lowest degree of malpractice" to "highest degree of malpractice" and Kelley and Kiril use a four-point scale from "no problems" to "major problems". Single-indicator judgements of election integrity mostly use a three-point classification to distinguish between elections with severe irregularities, elections with less severe irregularities, and elections without irregularities. 43 Finally, evaluating data collection involves, apart from sources and measurement level, an assessment of the coding process. Here, the use of multiple coders, clear coding scales, and documentation of coding procedures, as well as access to replication data, are important. If data gathering is done by various coders, inter-coder reliability scores give an indication of differences between coders and provide a margin of error that can be taken into account in subsequent analyses. This was done by seven out of 11 data sets. In terms of coding scales, scores along the scale are generally made explicit and explained well. Moreover, most studies provide clear documentation of the coding process and access to replication data.
Summarizing, most data sets measure election integrity based on a single overarching indicator using a single source of information. Only five out of 11 data sets measure election integrity with multiple indicators (Anglin, Birch, Kelley and Kiril, Hyde and Marinov, Simpser); seven out of 11 studies use multiple sources to measure election integrity (Anglin, Van de Walle, Lindberg, Hyde and Marinov, Donno, Schedler, Simpser) ; and seven out of 11 studies use multiple coders to code elections and report inter-coder reliability scores (Birch, Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo, Kelley and Kiril, Hyde and Marinov, Donno, Schedler, Simpser) . 44 
Which elections are difficult to measure?
The previous section discussed how the different data sets on election integrity conceptualized and measured election integrity. This provides substantive reasons to prefer some data sets over others, to which I will return in the conclusion. However, would it be possible to evaluate the relative strengths and weaknesses of the data sets discussed here empirically? Unfortunately, an objective or "true" measure of election integrity that could be used as an external benchmark to evaluate how well the different data sets tap election integrity does not exist.
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DemocratizationInstead, this section analyses the extent to which different data sets disagree about the election integrity of the same elections, attempting to identify the sources of disagreement. 46 Here, data sets are considered as repeated measurements of election integrity, and variance in election integrity scores (that is, disagreement), is considered as indicating potential measurement error. If measurement error is non-random, identifying its sources can provide clues about how to improve future data. 47 Now, variance in election integrity scores may be caused by the choices made in terms of conceptualization, operationalization, and data collection discussed in Section 2, most notably whether authors scored elections based on (a) frequency of irregularities versus intentionality and/or outcome effects, (b) multiple indicators versus single indicators, (c) multiple sources versus single sources, and (d) multiple coders versus single coders. In addition, it may also be the case that certain types of elections are more difficult to code, generating higher variance in election integrity scores. For example, election integrity scores for elections in the early years of the third wave, that is, the 1970s and 1980s, might generate higher disagreement because often less information is available about the conduct of these elections. Also, the first elections that took place just after the transition to de jure multiparty elections might have higher variance in electoral integrity scores. Likewise, elections that took place after civil war or coup d'état might stir more disagreement among researchers. Also, if a country has been holding elections for a longer period of time, those elections might be better documented, easing the assessment of election integrity. Moreover, elections with medium levels of election integrity might be elections on which there is more disagreement, since differences in coding between authors might become most apparent in this middle category of notclearly-rigged but not-entirely-clean elections. Finally, I evaluated whether there was any difference in disagreement depending on the number of times an election was coded (that is, how many data sets coded the election), region, and election type (constituent assembly, legislative, and executive elections).
To test these hypotheses, data on electoral integrity from the 11 data sets evaluated in Section 2 were used. This resulted in a sample of 746 elections with two or more election integrity scores in 95 third and fourth wave regimes in Southern Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, sub-Saharan Africa, South America, and Central America from 1974 until 2009. 48 To construct the measure of disagreement, all election integrity scores were recoded to vary from zero to one, running from low integrity to high integrity. For the data sets that included multiple indicators, I took the average of all specific indicators to create an overall election integrity score. 49 Elections that were scored exactly the same were coded as "agreed". For the remaining elections, since the different data sets use different coding scales, we need to differentiate disagreement based on mere differences in coding scales from disagreement about the actual election integrity score. The least fine-grained scale used to score electoral integrity is a three-point ordinal scale. 50 On a scale ranging from zero to one, this means that the scale differentiates elections with low integrity (0-0.33), medium integrity 726 C. van Ham (0.33 -0.66), and high integrity (0.66-1). Hence, I coded elections that received electoral integrity scores within the same category, that is, elections that received scores between 0 and 0.33; between 0.33 and 0.66, and between 0.66 and 1 as "low disagreement". Elections that were scored in multiple categories, for example twice receiving a score of 0.5 and once of 1, were coded as "high disagreement". Table 4 shows the results. Of the 746 elections that were coded by more than one data set, 14% received the same election integrity score. Another 27% received different election integrity scores, but scores that were within the same election integrity category (that is, between 0 and 0.33; 0.33 and 0.66; or 0.66 and 1), indicating low disagreement that could have been driven simply by the use of different coding scales. For 59% of elections however, disagreement was higher, as authors coded elections in different categories of election integrity, substantially disagreeing about the level of integrity in these elections. Now, do choices made in terms of conceptualization, operationalization, and data collection affect disagreement about electoral integrity? The second row of Table 4 shows the difference in disagreement between elections coded only on the basis of frequency of irregularities, and elections coded both on the basis of intentionality/outcome consequences and the frequency of irregularities (the "mixed" category). Since the Kelley and Kiril, Hyde and Marinov, as well as Simpser data sets provide election integrity data for most elections and measure the frequency of irregularities, there are no elections that were only coded by authors using intentionality as a criterion. However, we can compare the mixed category with the category that is purely based on frequency of irregularities, and this seems to indicate a quite marked difference in disagreement. If elections are purely scored on the basis of the frequency of irregularities, disagreement about electoral integrity scores is very low for most elections: over 80% of elections are in the "agreed" and "low disagreement" category. For only 17% of elections there is strong disagreement between authors, compared to 68% of the elections that are coded by a mix of approaches. A similar picture emerges considering the number of indicators: clearly, if elections were coded using multiple indicators for electoral integrity, disagreement is substantially lower than if elections were coded using a mix of single and multiple indicators. 51 Turning to sources, there are only a few elections that are coded only by data sets using multiple sources, leaving most elections in the mixed category. Hence, it is difficult to evaluate the consequences of the use of multiple or single sources. Finally, comparing the use of multiple coders versus a single coder appears to indicate that disagreement about electoral integrity is substantially lower for elections coded by multiple coders (again compared to the mixed category). Concluding, the substantive reasons to prefer measurements of election integrity that are based on frequency of irregularities, multiple indicators, and multiple coders seem to be supported by the descriptive findings reported here. A note of caution is in order however: in the data sets evaluated here, the first two measurement choices are often made in conjunction, making it hard to separate the effect of each individually. (12) 21% (7) 42% (14) 100% ( (7) 0% (0) 100% (34) Turning to the other factors, I find substantial effects only for the number of times the election was coded, the level of election integrity, post-conflict elections, and region. Regarding the number of times an election is coded, the most important difference appears between elections that were coded two or three times, and those that were coded more often: disagreement is markedly higher in elections coded by more than three data sets. Concerning the level of election integrity (measured as the average election integrity score of all data sets that coded that election), our expectation that elections of medium integrity would have highest disagreement is only partially borne out by the data. Rather, it seems that there is little disagreement about elections with high election integrity, and disagreement is much higher for elections of both medium and low integrity. Regarding the possible temporal bias in election integrity scores, I expected early elections to have higher disagreement because information about integrity is relatively more difficult to find, however this appears not to be the case: in fact, agreement about early years elections is higher. Concerning first elections and democratic experience, disagreement appears to be slightly higher in first elections and in countries that have had relatively few elections, but also here the differences are not very large. Turning to the influence of conflict and coups d'état on election integrity judgements, election integrity in post-conflict elections does appear to be more contested, as disagreement is markedly higher for those elections. This is also the case for elections having taken place after a coup d'état, but the difference is less marked (the number of post-coup elections is also quite small). Finally, election integrity appears especially difficult to code for elections in former Soviet republics and sub-Saharan Africa, while appearing easier to code in Southern Europe. This finding may be driven by the lower levels of election integrity in the former two regions, and (especially in former Soviet republics) also by the fact that election integrity is often undermined by attempts to tilt the level playing field in the period well before elections, constituting irregularities that are relatively more difficult to detect. 
Conclusion
While elections have become common practice around the world, the integrity of elections varies greatly. Mapping the "menu of manipulation" that undermines electoral integrity is hence increasingly important.
54 This article compared crossnational data sets on election integrity, evaluating how they conceptualize and measure election integrity.
In terms of conceptualization, election integrity is a complex concept, and the way authors choose to conceptualize it will depend on their specific research purposes. For large N comparative research on election integrity, using a positive conceptualization of election integrity based on universal criteria and combining a concept-and process-based approach, seems preferable. This is because it allows researchers to specify criteria for measurement of election integrity that are explicit, can be validly measured, and are cross-nationally comparable.
730

C. van Ham
However, researchers that are specifically interested in intentional electoral fraud may find negative conceptualizations more useful, and researchers studying election integrity in small N research or as an independent variable may prefer using particular criteria. In terms of measurement, I contend that operationalizing election integrity using multiple indicators is preferable as elections are complex logistical processes and electoral malpractice takes "a panoply of forms". 55 Hence, multiple indicators allow for more precise and valid measurement of election integrity. In addition, gathering data using multiple sources and multiple coders mitigates measurement bias, improving both validity and reliability of election integrity data.
The article concluded with an empirical analysis of 11 cross-national data sets, analysing the sources of disagreement about election integrity. I find that for elections coded on the basis of the frequency of irregularities (and not assumed intentionality or consequences for the election outcome), disagreement about election integrity is substantially lower. I also find that disagreement was lower for elections coded using multiple indicators. The findings for using multiple coders and sources were less clear, however there are still good substantive reasons to believe that election integrity data collected using multiple sources and multiple coders improves measurement validity and reliability. Other factors that affected disagreement about election integrity were the number of times elections were coded (more scores corresponding to higher disagreement), the level of election integrity (elections of lower integrity generated stronger disagreement), post-conflict elections and elections in former Soviet republics and sub-Saharan Africa.
What are the implications of these findings for future research on electoral integrity? For researchers without the resources to gather data themselves, there are good substantive reasons to prefer data sets that measure election integrity using multiple indicators and multiple sources. The data sets developed by Birch, Kelley and Kiril, Hyde and Marinov, and Simpser come closest to these ideals, but all have limitations. All four measure specific irregularities, though Birch more extensively than the other three authors. However, only Hyde and Marinov as well as Simpser use multiple sources to measure election integrity (yet they measure a more limited set of irregularities). The best alternative seems to combine these data sets and use them as repeated measurements of election integrity. This approach provides researchers with an estimate of the margin of error for each election, and also allows researchers to gather additional information for elections on which disagreement about election integrity is high.
For researchers aiming to gather new data on election integrity, careful consideration of the research goals is important, and different choices may be preferable depending on the scope of the research (in-depth country study or large N comparative research) and the research questions asked (is election integrity the independent or dependent variable). In this article I have argued that for the purposes of large N comparative research seeking to explain election integrity, explicit, universal criteria that can be validly measured are preferable. New data sets could improve the validity and reliability of election integrity data by using such Democratizationcriteria, and subsequently measure election integrity on the basis of multiple indicators and sources. Thereby data on specific types of irregularities as well as the frequency, timing, and geographical spread of irregularities can be expanded. This would not only allow for more valid and reliable measurement of election integrity, but also enable more in-depth analysis of its causal dynamics. Getting elections right is not easy, and getting the measurement of election integrity right probably even less so. However, given the importance of elections for democracy, it is an effort well worth undertaking.
are only available for 19 elections, of which only nine match our sample of third wave regimes. Also, Pastor's data reported in his 1999 article only include flawed elections, omitting the remainder of the sample; and Schmeets collected extensive multi-indicator data on election integrity based on the election observation reports of the OSCE; however these data are not publicly available. Finally, the fraud indicator in the Database of Political Institutions was excluded due to a large number of false negatives. See Birch, Electoral Malpractice; Schmeets, "Vrije en eerlijke verkiezingen"; and notes 5 and 16. 29. Anglin, "International Election Monitoring." 30. Carothers, "The Observers Observed," 22. 31. See note 6 above. For an overview of specific indicators and coding scales used, see the online Appendix, Table C benchmark, however that would mean using a more encompassing and less precise measure to benchmark the validity of election integrity data. 46. Readers interested in dataset-by-dataset comparisons are referred to Van Ham, "Beyond Electoralism?" 47 . This approach follows a procedure common in evaluating the validity of expert surveys, where experts are considered as providing "repeated measurements" of an underlying concept, for example party positions, and variance in answers between experts is considered to indicate potential measurement error. See Steenbergen and Marks, "Evaluating Expert Judgments." 48. Of these 746 elections, 17% was coded by two data sets, 20% by three, 19% by four, 23% by five, 15% by six, and 6% by seven or eight authors. Note that the sample of elections analysed here only includes elections that formally met international standards for elections, that is, de jure multi-party/candidate and universal suffrage. See Van Ham, "Beyond Electoralism?" For the empirical scope of each data set, see online Appendix, Table D of the online Appendix, the effects of these variables were estimated separately. 53. To test which of these explanatory factors have a robust effect on disagreement about election integrity scores, I estimated ordinal logit models predicting disagreement about election integrity. The results of these models are shown in Table D 
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